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FEDERAL COURTS AND TAKINGS LITIGATION
Ann Woolhandler* and Julia D. Mahoney**
INTRODUCTION
Disagreement about takings claims extends to both substantive
and jurisdictional issues. Those favoring deference to land use regulation as a substantive matter would minimize the role of the federal
courts in takings disputes. 1 Those favoring less substantive deference
to governmental land use decisions argue that takings claims should
be treated as favorably as are other federal constitutional rights that
can readily be brought in federal courts under the Civil Rights Act of
1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 2
Both sides of the dispute emphasize different aspects of the role
that the federal courts have traditionally played with respect to takings

© 2022 Ann Woolhandler and Julia D. Mahoney. Individuals and nonprofit
institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below
cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the authors, provides a
citation to the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* William Minor Lile Professor of Law and Armistead M. Dobie Research Professor
of Law, University of Virginia.
** John S. Battle Professor of Law, University of Virginia. Our thanks to Eric Claeys,
Michael Collins, Nicole Garnett, Caleb Nelson, George Rutherglen, Paul Stephan, and
Robert Thomas for helpful comments and conversations. Ari Anderson, Meghana
Puchalapalli, and Killian Wyatt provided outstanding research assistance.
1 See William E. Ryckman, Jr., Land Use Litigation, Federal Jurisdiction, and the Abstention
Doctrines, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 377, 380–81 (1981) (arguing that local land use controversies
are often appropriate for federal court abstention); Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension
of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 206–07, 271 (2004) (arguing that state
law often predominates in takings claims, and that the Supreme Court should intervene
only where it can provide objective rules that do not depend on state law).
2 See, e.g., Brian W. Blaesser, Closing the Federal Courthouse Door on Property Owners: The
Ripeness and Abstention Doctrines in Section 1983 Land Use Cases, 2 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 73, 74
(1988); Michael W. McConnell, Horne and the Normalization of Takings Litigation: A Response
to Professor Echeverria, 43 ENV’T L. REP. 10749, 10750 (2013); Ilya Somin & Shelley Ross
Saxer, Overturning a Catch-22 in the Knick of Time: Knick v. Township of Scott and the Doctrine
of Precedent, 47 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 545, 552–53 (2020) (indicating that takings claims under
Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), were treated less favorably for
federal court access than other constitutional claims); Robert H. Thomas, Sublimating
Municipal Home Rule and Separation of Powers in Knick v. Township of Scott, 47 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 509, 520 (2020) (same).
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claims. Those favoring deference to government land use decisions
treat the federal courts’ assuming a more active role as an unjustified
reversal of the New Deal’s adoption of deferential review for economic
rights. 3 On the other hand, property rights advocates argue that
sidelining takings cases “was never intended by the Congress when it
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871,” 4 and that federal court
abstention in land use cases flouts the “Congressional mandate to
adjudicate claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” 5
These differences were brought into sharp relief by the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Knick v. Township of Scott. 6 Knick overruled
Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank, 7 which had treated many takings
claims as unripe until the property owner had unsuccessfully sought
just compensation in the state courts, on the theory that the
Constitution only addressed deprivations for public use when
compensation was found to be lacking. The owner could petition for
Supreme Court review of the state court determination, but San Remo
Hotel v. San Francisco made clear that preclusion would generally bar
the disappointed owner from bringing a subsequent action in the
lower federal courts. 8 In Knick, the Supreme Court held that a
property owner could immediately resort to a lower federal court,
without first pursuing compensation in state court.
While Knick clearly expands the lower federal court role in takings
claims, many questions remain. We do not know how federal courts
will respond to the increase in claims—whether they will embrace a
robust federal role in land use cases, or use various abstention

3 See David A. Dana, Not Just a Procedural Case: The Substantive Implications of Knick for
State Property Law and Federal Takings Doctrine, 47 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 591, 600 (2020)
(stating that Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019), “hints at a rejection of the
post-Lochner idea that in a modern economy, economic regulation of the sort that implicates
the use of and economic value in property must be more deferentially reviewed by the
courts”).
4 Blaesser, supra note 2, at 135; see also id. at 119 (use of abstention doctrines in land
use cases undermines the fundamental purposes of § 1983); Brian T. Hodges, Knick v.
Township of Scott, PA: How a Graveyard Dispute Resurrected the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause, 60 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 24 (2020) (emphasizing the importance of the 1871 Civil
Rights Act).
5 R.S. Radford & Jennifer Fry Thompson, The Accidental Abstention Doctrine: After
Thirty Years, the Case for Diverting Federal Takings Claims to State Court Under Williamson
County Has Yet to Be Made, 67 BAYLOR L. REV. 567, 612 (2015); cf. McConnell, supra note 2,
at 10751 (arguing that exhaustion and deference to local knowledge are not generally
required in § 1983 cases).
6 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
7 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
8 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
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doctrines to rein them in. 9 While pro-regulatory and pro-property
rights scholars have predictably taken sharply contrasting positions as
to the appropriate federal court role post-Knick, 10 this Article will
recommend a middle-of-the-road approach, based partly on history
and partly on an assessment of where the lower federal courts may most
usefully contribute to the fair determination of takings claims.
This Article first gives an overview of the role of the federal courts
in takings claims over time, with a view to providing a more complete
picture than that supplied by focusing either on the Lochner/New Dealera dichotomy or on the advent of the 1871 Civil Rights Act (current
§ 1983). It traces the fairly robust role of the federal courts in
protecting property under a nonconfiscation norm both before and
during the Lochner era. It also points out that the legislative history of
the 1871 Civil Rights Act does not support a firm conclusion that
Congress intended takings claims to be litigable under § 1983. And
§ 1983 thereafter played little role in takings cases, which were
generally pursued as claims under diversity jurisdiction or under the
federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 11
9 The Supreme Court, 2018 Term—Leading Cases, 133 HARV. L. REV. 322, 330–31 (2019)
(noting issues of how the federal courts would proceed after Knick); Dwight Merriam, Rose
Mary Knick and the Story of Chicken Little, 47 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 639, 650–51 (2020)
(indicating that the effect of abstention remained to be seen); Stewart E. Sterk & Michael
C. Pollack, A Knock on Knick’s Revival of Federal Takings Litigation, 72 FLA. L. REV. 419, 441
(2020) (suggesting that Knick may have foreclosed abstention pending resolution of state
constitutional claims); John Echeverria, Knick v. Township of Scott: A Procedural Boost for
Takings Claimants, TRENDS, Jan.–Feb. 2020, at 11 (discussing possibility of abstention and
certification).
10 Compare David L. Callies & Ellen R. Ashford, Knick in Perspective: Restoring Regulatory
Takings Remedy in Hawai’i, U. HAW. L. REV., Winter 2019, at 136, 146 (referring to “[t]he
importance of access to the federal court system to resolve regulatory takings disputes”),
and Ashley Vander Wal, Case Comment, Assessing the Takings Clause and Ending the StateLitigation Requirement, 95 N.D. L. REV. 229, 242 (2020) (arguing that Knick “restores
property ownership as a fundamental right protected by the Constitution”), with Sterk &
Pollack, supra note 9, at 437–38 (arguing that state courts are in a better position than
federal courts to resolve the many state law property issues that arise in takings cases); Laura
D. Beaton & Matthew D. Zinn, Knick v. Township of Scott: A Source of New Uncertainty for
State and Local Governments in Regulatory Takings Challenges to Land Use Regulation, 47
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 623, 636–38 (2020) (recommending abstention and certification in
light of the importance of state law to takings questions), Echeverria, supra note 9, at 11
(arguing that the nature of the property interest is always a threshold question that is
appropriate for state courts), and James Pollack, Note, The Takings Project Revisited: A Critical
Analysis of this Expanding Threat to Environmental Law, 44 HARV. ENV’T. L. REV. 235, 238
(2020) (stating that Knick is one of many cases that “strike at the core of government ability
and willingness at all levels to regulate land and water to preserve the environment, protect
public health, and mitigate damage caused by climate change”).
11 See Michael G. Collins, “Economic Rights,” Implied Constitutional Actions, and the Scope
of Section 1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493 (1989) (discussing the importance of § 1331 actions in
economic rights cases); Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally
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The New Deal saw the federal courts’ retreat from the nonconfiscation norm, and the rise of abstention doctrines that reduced
the federal court role in adjudicating such claims. But the retreat from
stringent substantive standards, as well as from federal court
jurisdiction, were more muted in takings claims than in other types of
economic claims. The history thus indicates that the lower federal
courts maintained a moderately active role in land use decisions
during the nineteenth century and during most of the twentieth
century.
It was only with the Court’s 1985 decision in Williamson County that
the Supreme Court reduced the federal courts’ role in takings to an
extent comparable to the New Deal decline with respect to other
economic rights. That decision offset for a time the potential increase
of takings claims that might have arisen from the Court’s 1978 decision
in Monell v. New York Department of Social Services, 12 which held that
municipalities were suable persons under § 1983. 13
Going forward after Knick’s overturning Williamson County, we ask:
What role should the federal courts play? The demise of Williamson
suggests that the federal courts may significantly increase their role in
land use decisions, 14 but it may also suggest that they will more actively
use abstention doctrines to reduce Knick’s impact. 15 We evaluate the
use of Pullman 16 and Burford 17 abstention doctrines in takings claims,
and find them inapt. We suggest an abstention doctrine specially for
takings cases that would sort out cases where the federal courts are
most likely to contribute to fair applications of the law. Finally, we
suggest that constitutionally-based actions brought under § 1331 may
be better homes for takings cases than § 1983 actions.
Part I of this Article traces the role of the federal courts in the
adjudication of takings claims both before and during the Lochner era.
Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77 (1997) (discussing the importance of diversity actions
for raising constitutional issues).
12 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
13 See Ryckman, supra note 1, at 390–91 (discussing increase in possible successful
takings claims in federal courts with the decisions in Monell and Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622 (1980)).
14 Cf. Pakdel v. City of San Francisco, 141 S. Ct. 2226, 2231 (2021) (per curiam)
(holding that the claim met finality requirements, and indicating that taking claims should
not be treated as of lesser constitutional status).
15 Cf. EHOF Lakeside II, L.L.C. v. Riverside Cnty. Transp. Comm’n, 826 Fed Appx.
669, 670 (9th Cir. 2020) (declining to decide “the precise scope of [Railroad Commission
v.] Pullman [312 U.S. 496 (1941)] in the post-Knick world”); Thinh Tran v. Dept. of Plan.,
Civ. No.19-00654, 2020 WL 3146584, slip op. at *1, *7 (D. Haw. June 12, 2020) (indicating
that Knick did not abrogate abstention doctrines and abstaining in a case involving
restrictions on short term rentals).
16 R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
17 Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
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Part II traces the New Deal development of abstention doctrines in
areas of economic rights, but also addresses the somewhat lesser use of
abstention for takings cases. It also describes the subsequent role of
the federal courts, including the late addition of takings cases as
encompassed within § 1983, the import of which was soon minimized
by Williamson County. Part III addresses the role the federal courts
should play post-Knick. It analyzes whether Pullman and Burford
abstention are a good fit for takings claims. 18 It then outlines categories of claims for which lower federal court jurisdiction may be more
and less warranted. Finally, it suggests that constitutional claims under
the federal question statute rather than § 1983 may be a better vehicle
for federal courts takings claims, Knick notwithstanding.
I.

PROPERTY BASED CLAIMS THROUGH THE LOCHNER ERA
A. Early Republic

The American colonies’ governance instruments often included
protections for property rights. 19 Under the Articles of Confederation,
however, many states failed to honor treaty provisions with Great
Britain, including provisions that no further confiscations of British
and Loyalist property should occur post-war, and that prewar British
debts should be paid. 20 In addition, state legislatures’ enactments of
debtor relief statutes and issuance of paper currency alarmed many

18 Cf. Blaesser, supra note 2, at 118–19 (arguing that greater familiarity with local
conditions does not warrant use of abstention doctrines in takings cases); McConnell, supra
note 2, at 10751 (arguing against local knowledge as a reason to deny a federal forum).
19 See, e.g., The Body of Liberties § 8 (1641), in 8 COLLECTIONS OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 216, 218 (F.C. Gray ed., Boston, Freeman and Bolles
1843) (“No mans Cattel or goods of what kinde soever shall be pressed or taken for any
publique use or service, unlesse it be by warrant grounded up on some act of the generall
Court, nor without such reasonable prices and hire as the ordinarie rates of the Countrie
do afford.”); Charter of Liberties and Privileges § 15 (1683), in 1 THE CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF NEW YORK, 1609–1822, at 95, 101 (Charles Z. Lincoln ed. 1906) (“Noe man of
what Estate or Condition soever shall be putt out of his Lands or Tenements . . . without
being brought to Answere by due Course of Law.”); JAMES W. ELY JR., THE GUARDIAN OF
EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 24–25 (3d ed.
2008) (discussing colonial policies as to compensation); Maureen E. Brady, The Domino
Effect in State Takings Law: A Response to 51 Imperfect Solutions, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 1455,
1457–58 (discussing colonial authority).
20 See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 43–45 (2016); cf. ELY, supra note 19, at 31 (indicating many state
constitutions protected against uncompensated takings).
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citizens and served as an impetus for 1787 Convention and the new
Constitution. 21
The Constitution of 1787 manifests the Framers’ desire to protect
interests in property and contract in various provisions, including in its
provision for federal courts. 22 Concerns about confiscation and contract non-enforcement helped to motivate the Supremacy Clause’s
provision that treaties as well as other federal law would be the
supreme law of the land. 23 And the Constitution prohibited states’
impairing the obligations of contract, coining money, and issuing bills
of credit. 24 The Bill of Rights proscribed the federal government’s
depriving life, liberty, and property without due process and taking
property without just compensation. 25
The anticonfiscation norm would prove central to the Supreme
Court’s nineteenth-century jurisprudence, 26 and the federal courts did
not shy from entertaining cases raising takings issues. Prior to the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Court’s more explicit treatment of
takings as violations of the Due Process Clause, the Court used treaty
provisions, 27 the Contract Clause, and the general common law to
provide redress for state and local takings.
Given the lack of general federal question jurisdiction before
1875, cases that raised takings issues in the lower federal courts
invoked diversity 28 or some other existing basis for jurisdiction. The
21 See KLARMAN, supra note 20, at 77–79 (discussing states’ issuance of paper currency
and bills of credit); id. at 81 (discussing debtor relief laws); id. at 86 (discussing concerns by
“most well-to-do Americans” over such legislation).
22 See id. at 45, 47 (noting problems of relying on state courts for treaty enforcement);
id. at 165 (citing to a letter from Jefferson to Madison as to problems a British creditor
would face in state court without a federal tribunal); id. at 167 (“The delegates were
especially determined to ensure that foreigners would have access to tribunals that would
fairly adjudicate their rights under federal treaties. . . .”); id. (also noting that federal
question jurisdiction was meant to keep state courts from nullifying treaties); Woolhandler,
supra note 11, at 85–86 (noting general agreement among scholars that concern as to state
debtor relief laws was an impetus for diversity jurisdiction).
23 KLARMAN, supra note 20, at 158 (noting Madison’s concerns with state treaty
violations); ELY, supra note 19, at 45 (indicating that the prohibitions on bills of attainder
protected against confiscations).
24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
25 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
26 See, e.g., Michael G. Collins, October Term, 1896—Embracing Due Process, 45 AM. J.
LEG. HIST. 71, 77 (2001) (citing authority).
27 See, e.g., Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813).
28 See Charles W. McCurdy, The Problem of General Constitutional Law: Thomas McIntyre
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, and the Supreme Court of the United States, 1868–1878, 18
GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3–4 (2020) (“Since 1810, if not before, the Court had considered
a much broader array of constitutional principles in cases arising from its diversity
jurisdiction (that is, civil cases with a constitutional cast that came up from federal trial
courts) than it had in cases arising from challenges of state laws said to violate the
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suits took a variety of forms. Where state legislation purported to divest
a party of title, an action between private claimants could raise the issue
of whether the state legislation could be given effect. For example, in
Fletcher v. Peck, the Court, in a suit between private parties, held that
the state could not retract a prior land grant without violating the
Contract Clause. 29 Using general law principles in Terrett v. Taylor, the
Court held that Virginia laws transferring Episcopal Church property
to the county overseers of the poor should be treated as having no
force, and it enjoined the overseers from claiming the property. 30 In
addition, the federal courts, as did the state courts, enjoined private
companies authorized by governments to build roads from invading
the owners’ property absent adequate provisions for compensation. 31
The federal courts might also award monetary relief. For example, in

Constitution of the United States (that is, federal question cases that came up on writ of
error to the highest state court).”).
29 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); see also Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1 (1823) (noting that
in a suit to recover land, it would violate the compact between Kentucky and Virginia
whereby Virginia titles would be recognized under the law of Virginia, to require the owner
to pay for improvements and to disallow mesne profits for the time before notice of the
adverse claim); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS 1789–1888, at 128–36 (1985) (“It seems clear in Fletcher that there was
nothing in the federal Constitution to make bribery a basis for striking down state
legislation.”); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–35,
at 602 (1988) (“[E]arly Marshall Court cases interpreting the Contract Clause were
notable . . . for being grounded not only on the text of the Constitution but on the first
principles of republican theory.”).
30 Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 52 (1815) (involving land in the District
of Columbia); see also Van Horne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (C.C.D. Pa.
1795) (when parties claimed under titles of different states, holding that the Pennsylvania
claimant should recover because the Connecticut statute giving compensatory lands was
ineffective, given that the legislature could not determine the value of lands); Bonaparte v.
Camden & A.R. Co., 3 F. Cas. 821, 831 (C.C.D.N.J. 1830) (in a case under alienage diversity,
entering an injunction against the road building company because it had not yet filed the
survey necessary for entering the land, and indicating that an injunction was proper where
a certain means of compensation that the owner did not have to initiate was not provided).
31 See Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497, 507 (1870) (granting an injunction
against removal of plaintiff’s wharf absent provision for compensation); see generally Robert
Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century State Just
Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57 (1999) (particularly focusing on state courts, and
concluding that early in the nineteenth century the courts did not so much order
compensation as enjoin the implementation of statutes that allowed for takings without
providing compensation). The federal courts also entertained ejectment actions against
federal officials whom plaintiffs claimed were occupying their land. See, e.g., Meigs v.
McClung’s Lessee, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 11, 18 (1815) (“The land is certainly the property of
the Plaintiff below; and the United States cannot have intended to deprive him of it by
violence, and without compensation.”); Brown v. Huger, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 305 (1858) (in
a removed ejectment action against a federal officer, ruling on the merits against the
plaintiff).
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Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., the Court in a diversity case upheld a damages
action for trespass on the case against a company that had built a dam
flooding plaintiff’s land. 32
When governments or their contractors employed eminent
domain powers, many states provided for administrative proceedings
with initial determinations of value by commissioners or juries, with a
subsequent appeal de novo to a regular state court. Property owners
sometimes brought the appeals as original actions against contractors
or local governments 33 in lower federal courts in diversity. The
condemnor/defendants argued against lower federal court jurisdiction, on the grounds that the review proceedings were not civil cases
and that eminent domain involved the sovereign prerogatives of the
state. 34 The Supreme Court repeatedly rejected these arguments,
reasoning that out-of-staters should not be deprived of their opportunity to use the federal courts to receive a fair determination of their
claims.
Overall, the federal courts played a fairly robust role in protecting
property rights against state and local encroachments well before the
advent of the Fourteenth Amendment. Of course, the state courts
entertained an even greater number of cases involving takings. 35
B. Passage of the Civil Right Act of 1871
The 1871 Civil Rights Act (current 42 U.S.C. § 1983) would have
no significant effect on takings claims until the latter part of the
twentieth century. Modern property rights advocates, however, have

32 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 175–81 (1871) (holding that the defense of statutory
authorization was invalid due to exceeding the statutory authority and due to the state’s not
providing for compensation); Hollingsworth v. Par. of Tensas, 17 F. 109, 117–18 (C.C.W.D.
La. 1883) (holding that an action involving building of a levee and flooding land could
proceed under general law despite state law to the contrary). Monetary relief, however, was
not awarded against sovereign entities. Brauneis, supra note 31, at 58.
33 See, e.g., Pac. R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1884) (approving removal of the
company’s appeal of the amount awarded against a city in an assessment of value and
benefits).
34 See, e.g., Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406–07 (1878) (rejecting arguments
as to sovereign prerogative and that the dispute was not a case); Removal Cases, 115 U.S. at
18–19 (exercising jurisdiction based on federal railroad charter and holding that the initial
determination, upon appeal to a court, became a case that the federal courts could
entertain).
35 See Brauneis, supra note 31, at 61 (noting that states decided more takings cases
than did the federal courts during the nineteenth century); Eric R. Claeys, Takings,
Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1577–1604 (2003)
(discussing the tradition of state regulatory takings cases).
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argued that the Congress that passed § 1983 clearly intended the
statute to address just compensation claims. 36
Section 1983 derives from § 1 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, also
known as the Ku Klux Klan Act. 37 The most familiar part of the Klan
Act today is § 1983’s provision allowing those whose constitutional
rights have been violated to sue the wrongdoing “person” for damages
and injunctive relief. But in keeping with its name, the Act also
forbade private conspiracies to violate constitutional rights. 38 Indeed,
the debates over the Act focused on whether the Constitution,
including the Fourteenth Amendment, gave Congress power to
prohibit private conspiracies. 39
Given Klan depredations on former enslaved persons and their
supporters, the Klan Act debates, as a whole, manifested concerns for
property protections. 40 Congressmen referred to house burnings in
addition to assaults on persons. 41 Section 1 of the 1871 Act, moreover,
was based on § 2 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which provided for
criminal penalties for “any person who, under color of any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, or custom” causes a deprivation of any rights
protected by the act. 42 Rights protected by the 1866 Act included the
rights of all citizens “of every race and color” to the “same right, in
every State . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 43 The

See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
Ku Klux Klan Act § 2.
See GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: THE
CONSTITUTION, COMMON LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866, at 83–84 (2013).
40 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 339 (Rep. Kelley), reprinted in THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, at 503 (Alfred Avins ed., 1967) (discussing an
instance where citizens of Pennsylvania who had purchased a mine in South Carolina
appealed for Presidential help in the face of Klan threats).
41 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (Rep. Perry), reprinted in THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 40, at 512 (“The [conspirators’] aim
appears . . . to murder and mutilate them [blacks and their friends], disperse their families,
burn their houses, and steal or destroy their property.”); CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
413 (Rep. Roberts), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note
40, at 521 (“Citizens of New York seeking homes in South Carolina and Alabama have had
their roofs burned over them and have been driven away by violence.”); CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 428 (Rep. Beatty), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’
DEBATES, supra note 40, at 522 (“[M]en were murdered, houses were burned . . . .”).
42 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866); RUTHERGLEN, supra note
39, at 83, 86–87.
43 Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 1.
36
37
38
39
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Fourteenth Amendment itself was meant to validate the 1866 Act,
given concerns as to congressional power to enact the 1866 Act. 44
One might of course argue that protections for property implicitly
encompass a just compensation guarantee. The argument for any
more specific intentions as to takings, however, principally relies on
statements of Representative John Bingham. In response to arguments
that the 1871 Act exceeded congressional powers under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 45 Bingham claimed that, in helping to draft
section one of that Amendment, he intended to make the first Eight
Amendments of the Constitution applicable to the states. He referred
to Barron v. Baltimore, in which the Supreme Court had held that the
Bill of Rights including the just compensation clause only applied to
the federal government. 46 Bingham recited each of the first Eight
Amendments, 47 and he seemed to see the 1871 Act generally as making
those provisions enforceable. 48
44 See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J.
1385, 1388–89 (1992) (noting agreement that § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was meant
to empower Congress to pass the 1866 Civil Rights Act).
45 See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 113 (1871) (Rep. Farnsworth), discussed in
Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original
Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 136 (1949).
46 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1833).
47 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 84 (1871) (Rep. Bingham).
48 See id. at 85 (“As I have already said, the States did deny to citizens the equal
protection of the laws, they did deny the rights of citizens under the Constitution, and
except to the extent of the express limitations upon the States, as I have shown, the citizen
had no remedy. They denied trial by jury, and he had no remedy. They took property
without compensation, and he had no remedy. They restricted the freedom of the press,
and he had no remedy. They restricted the freedom of speech, and he had no remedy.
They restricted the rights of conscience, and he had no remedy. They bought and sold
men who had no remedy. Who dare say, now that the Constitution has been amended, that
the nation cannot by law provide against all such abuses and denials of right as these in
States and by States, or combinations of persons?”). Rep. Dawes also apparently saw
enforcement of the Bill of Rights as encompassed by the Act. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.,
1st Sess. 475–76, reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 40,
at 535–36. He recited several Bill of Rights provisions, although he did not mention just
compensation. See also CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (Sen. Frelinghuysen),
reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 40, at 541 (referring
to protections against violence, and to “the right that private property shall not be taken
without compensation” as a privilege protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 310 (Rep. Maynard), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION
AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 40, at 503 (responding to a question as to which rights,
privileges or immunities a conspiracy must be leveled against, referring to Article IV
privileges and immunities, voting, and “any of the personal rights which the Constitution
guaranties to the citizen—freedom of speech, of the press; in religion, in house, papers,
and effects; from arrest without warrant, from being twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense”). There was, however, little in the rest of the extensive debates over the 1871 Act
to support this Bingham’s incorporationist reading. Cf. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
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Bingham’s argument that the 1871 Act enforced the Bill of Rights
thus depended on his argument that section one of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights as against the states, and
thereby authorized Congress to enforce the Bill of Rights against state
action in the 1871 Act. But the proposition that the Fourteenth
Amendment, when promulgated, incorporated the Bill of Rights
remains a highly contested proposition. 49 On one side are scholars
championing incorporation, such as Akhil Amar. 50 They emphasize
Bingham’s statements, many of which were not made during the
debates as to Fourteenth Amendment itself 51—including Bingham’s
reference to Barron and the first Eight Amendments during the debates on the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act several years later. 52 On the other
hand are scholars such as Charles Fairman who argue that neither the
congressional debates as a whole on the Fourteenth Amendment, nor
the state ratification debates, support incorporation. 53 The argument
that the 1871 Act definitely encompassed just compensation claims is
314 (Rep. Burchard), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra
note 40, at 545 (disagreeing with views of Bingham and Dawes).
49 See, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 123 (1988) (“Only
one historical conclusion can therefore be drawn: namely, that Congress and the state
legislatures never specified whether section one was intended to be simply an equality
provision or a provision protecting absolute rights as well.”).
50 See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 181–214 (1998) (reviewing
scholarship); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986) (arguing incorporation was intended); see also
Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J.
57 (1993) (same).
51 These scholars rely particularly on statements that were made as to an unadopted
proposal prior to the one that would become section one of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In that earlier debate Bingham referred to the Bill of Rights and Barron v. Baltimore, as he
would in 1871. See AMAR, supra note 50, at 182 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1088–94 (1866)) (referring to a February 28, 1866, speech); cf. Fairman, supra note 45, at
35–37 (1949) (indicating the proposal was tabled). Subsequently, Bingham proposed to
the Joint Committee working on the amendments to add language “nor take private
property for public use without just compensation,” but that proposal was not adopted. See
id. at 41–42; RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 142 (1977). Incorporationists also cite to Senator Howard who
introduced the final version of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Senate, and who made
specific reference to the first Eight Amendments, including just compensation. See AMAR,
supra note 50, at 185–86; cf. Fairman, supra note 45, at 55–58; BERGER, supra, at 148.
52 AMAR, supra note 50, at 183 (relying, inter alia, on the 1871 statements); see also
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 app. at 110–18 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (same).
53 See generally Fairman, supra note 45; BERGER, supra note 51, at 134–65; cf. Harrison,
supra note 44, at 1388, 1397 (while hesitating “to attribute to most participants in the
framing and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment any precise notion of the meaning
of Section 1, other than that it was designed to forbid Black Codes and constitutionalize the
Civil Rights Act of 1866,” arguing that the amendment was meant to assure equality as to
rights such as those described in the 1866 Civil Rights Act); NELSON, supra note 49, at 123.
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thus a subset of the argument that that Fourteenth Amendment as
promulgated incorporated the first Eight Amendments. And that
argument is inconclusive.
Bingham’s reference to takings during the 1871 debates would
end up playing an additional role in modern takings debates beyond
the argument that takings claims were necessarily encompassed within
the 1871 Act. As discussed below, the Court’s decision in Monell v.
Department of Social Services 54 that municipalities could be liable as
“persons” under § 1983 would turn that statute into a significant
vehicle for takings cases. 55 Justice Brennan used Bingham’s reference
to Barron during the 1871 debates 56 to support making municipalities
liable as “persons” under § 1983 in Monell—not itself a takings case.
Brennan’s Monell argument was that Bingham explicitly referred to
takings, and that takings remedies necessarily required municipal
liability. 57 It thus followed that “persons” who could be liable under
§ 1983 included municipalities.
Brennan’s reasoning, however, is problematic. First, it depends
on reading Bingham’s questionable incorporation views into the 1871
Act, as well as into the Fourteenth Amendment under which it was
enacted. Second, it assumes that a takings remedy necessarily encompasses entity liability, although individual relief such as ejectment
actions could provide at least some remedies. 58 And finally, Monell
notwithstanding, there is little in the legislative history of the 1871 Civil

54 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
55 See infra notes 107–13 and accompanying text.
56 436 U.S. at 686–87.
57 Id. at 687. Brennan also argued that the broad purposes of the Act supported
municipal liability. Id. at 685–86. The Monell decision overturned the Court’s prior
unanimous determination in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), that Congress had
not made municipalities liable under § 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 663. In Monroe, the Court
reasoned that Congress’s rejection of the so-called Sherman Amendment—which would
have made municipalities liable for mob violence—indicated that Congress did not intend
municipalities to be liable under § 1983. 365 U.S. at 187–90. Brennan in Monell reasoned
that the Sherman Amendment’s rejection did not foreclose municipal liability for their own
constitutional violations in § 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 669–683. He also rejected the Monroe
court’s determination that the inclusion of bodies politic as “persons” under the Dictionary
Act did not control the interpretation of § 1983. Id. at 688–89; The Dictionary Act, ch. 71,
§ 2, 16 Stat. 431, 431 (1871) (“[I]n all acts hereafter passed . . . the word ‘person’ may
extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate . . . unless the context shows that
such words were intended to be used in a more limited sense.”). The 1874 Revised Statutes,
however, retroactively removed “bodies politic” from the definition of persons. See ch. 1,
§ 1, 18 Stat. 1, 1 (1874), discussed in CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 785–86
(2011); Katherine Mims Crocker, Reconsidering Section 1983’s Nonabrogation of Sovereign
Immunity, 73 FLA. L. REV. 523, 568–74 (2021).
58 See ejectment actions cited supra note 31.
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Rights Act to support municipal liability as opposed to individual
liability for constitutional claims of any type. 59
C. The Lochner Era
Although not employing § 1983 as a vehicle for takings claims, the
Court in the late nineteenth century held that the prohibition on
takings without just compensation was one of the fundamental
protections of the Due Process Clause. 60 During the Lochner era, the
Court decided, for example, that a city-authorized railroad would have
to provide compensation for interference with easements of light and
air of adjoining property owners, 61 and also disapproved certain
requirements to allow third party use. 62 While rejecting general

59 See Monell, 436 U.S. at 721 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As then-Justice Rehnquist
pointed out in his Monell dissent, “As the Court concedes, only Representative Bingham
raised a concern which could be satisfied only by relief against governmental bodies. Yet
he never directly related this concern to § 1 of the Act. Indeed, Bingham stated at the
outset, ‘I do not propose now to discuss the provisions of the bill in detail,’ CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 82 (1871), and, true to his word, he launched into an extended
discourse on the beneficent purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. But cf. Nw.
Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 18 F. Cas. 393, 394 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1873) (holding that the
plaintiff corporation that filed the bill in equity was a person who could sue under the 1871
Act on a Contract Clause claim, and suggesting that a corporation that acted under color
of state law could be sued as a defendant). The case was brought against Hyde Park and its
officers. Id. at 393. The case was ultimately heard in state court, and the Supreme Court
on direct review affirmed a decision against the plaintiff on the merits of the Contract
Clause claim. Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 666–70 (1878); see also Gaughan v.
Nw. Fertilizing Co., 10 F. Cas. 91, 93 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1873) (remanding the case to state
court).
60 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 237, 241 (1896)
(quoting inter alia from Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), decided under the
Contract Clause, and Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655 (1874), decided under general
common law, and stating “a judgment of a state court, even if it be authorized by statute,
whereby private property is taken for the State or under its direction for public use, without
compensation made or secured to the owner, is, upon principle and authority, wanting in
the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”); id. at 241, 258
(nevertheless upholding the one-dollar award in the case); Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269,
277, 279 (1898) (in a suit apparently brought as a federal question case, enjoining as
violative of due process the village’s condemning the property and then assessing the owner
for the cost of the condemnation plus costs far in excess of special benefits).
61 See Muhlker v. N.Y. & Harlem R.R. Co., 197 U.S. 544, 570 (1905) (on direct review).
62 Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896) (applying, on direct review,
a public use limitation to the commission’s order that the railroad allow farmers to build a
grain elevator on its property); Del., Lackawanna & W. R.R. Co. v. Morristown, 276 U.S. 182,
191, 195 (1928) (not stating the ground for jurisdiction; approving an injunction because
the Fourteenth Amendment was violated by an ordinance compelling the railroad to make
part of its property available for use as a hack stand).
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challenges to zoning laws, 63 the Court sometimes disallowed particular
applications or restrictions on use. 64 And while it often allowed governments to impose costs of grade improvements on railroads, it
sometimes found that a particular imposition of costs was arbitrary. 65
Many of the Court’s takings decisions occurred by review of state
court decisions (“direct review”), 66 but original federal actions were
also common. The federal court actions were typically for injunctions—for example to enjoin an alleged expropriation without
compensation. 67 Jurisdiction could be based on federal question 68 or
diversity. And eminent domain valuations continued to be heard in
the federal courts using diversity jurisdiction. 69

63 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394–95 (1926) (apparently a
federal question injunction action; rejecting a constitutional challenge to a zoning
ordinance that included a prohibition on apartment houses); id. at 395 (indicating arbitrary
applications could be challenged); cf. ELY, supra note 19, at 120 (noting it was “something
of a paradox” why the Court approved land use control, but zoning may have been seen as
generally helping property rights).
64 Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 241 (1905) (reversing the state
supreme court, and reinstating a suit for an injunction against the enforcement of an
ordinance that would disallow plaintiff’s building of a gas works on her property; the new
restriction on the use of the property brought it “within that class of cases wherein the court
may restrain the arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of the police power which amounts
to a taking of property without due process of law and an impairment of property rights
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.”); Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (reversing the state supreme court in an injunctive action,
to hold that the zoning classification as applied to the plaintiff violated the Fourteenth
Amendment).
65 See Nashville, Chattanooga & Saint Louis Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935)
(holding, on direct review of a declaratory action from state court, that on the specific facts
of the case, the application of a statute that required railroads to pay one half of grade
improvements possibly violated the Fourteenth Amendment); id. at 423–25 (indicating lack
of prior serious safety problems and that the underpass was part of a highway project that
would detract from railroad business); Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway
Comm’n, 294 U.S. 613 (1935) (holding, on appeal from a state court grant of mandamus
to the highway commission to force compliance by the company, that the pipeline company
could not be required to relocate pipelines without compensation from its right of way for
highway construction).
66 See, e.g., Muhlker v. N.Y. & Harlem R.R. Co., 197 U.S. 544, 548 (1905).
67 Cuyahoga River Power Co. v. City of Akron, 240 U.S. 462, 463–64 (1916)
(reinstating a federal question injunction action in which the company alleged that the city
planned to appropriate its water rights without initiating an action for compensation).
68 Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 364 (1930) (apparently a federal question suit,
unsuccessful on the merits, to enjoin state highway commissioners from acquiring land
from the railroad as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment and the state constitution);
Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384 (apparently federal question injunction action).
69 See Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 247 (1905)
(rejecting arguments against federal courts’ entertaining such cases in allowing removal
based on diversity); id. at 253–54 (discussing that the state could not deprive out-of-staters
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The prohibition on uncompensated takings, moreover, infused
the Court’s decisions well beyond those more squarely tied to real
property ownership and use. For example, the prohibition on
confiscation was central to the federal courts’ active policing of
railroad rate regulation. The Court’s decision in Smyth v. Ames requiring that rates provide a fair return on the current value of the railroad
property was based on eminent domain’s requiring reimbursement for
fair market value. 70
Another area where nonconfiscation figured prominently was in
judicial review of the Texas Railroad Commission’s allocation of
petroleum drilling rights. 71 The Commission was charged with regulating drilling both to prevent waste and to assure the correlative rights
of owners in the common pool. Drilling rights were thus to be
proportional to the oil and gas attributable to a particular owner’s
holdings, and not unduly reduced by disproportional or wasteful
drilling of others. Commission orders, however, often appeared to
have favored smaller in-state holders. The Commission’s orders were
appealable to the courts in Travis County, where the state capital
Austin was located. Both the state courts and federal courts in Travis
County heard appeals from Commission orders. And the federal
courts did not shrink from findings that orders were confiscatory on
federal or state grounds. 72
of a fair tribunal, and that direct review would be insufficient as to issues of state law and as
to amount).
70 See, e.g., Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 528 (1898).
71 As the Court would describe the common law of Texas prior to further regulation,
the owner of land has title to oil and gas in place and, likewise, to the oil and gas
which migrate to formations under his land through drainage from other lands.
Under that rule, he may produce all the oil and gas that will flow out of the well
on his land, subject to the exercise by other landowners of the same right of
capture through drilling offsetting wells, so as to get their full share . . . . [T]he
common law of the State did not, apparently, afford a remedy against depleting
the common supply by wasteful taking or use of oil or gas drawn from the wells
on one’s own property. But since 1899 the Legislature of the State has prohibited,
or curbed, certain practices in the production of gas and oil which it recognized
as wasteful.
Thompson v. Consol. Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 68–69 (1937). State law thereafter
provided that the Commission should police waste and preserve the correlative rights of
owners. Id.
72 See, e.g., Thompson, 300 U.S. at 78 (appeal from a federal district court). The
Commission effectively limited production by large owners who had existing contracts for
the gas they produced, thereby requiring them to purchase from smaller owners who would
otherwise have to shut their wells for lack of a market for their gas. Id. at 62–63. Justice
Brandeis’s opinion stated,
The necessary operation and effect of such orders is to take from complainant
and others similarly situated substantial and valuable interests in their private
marketing contracts and commitments and in the use of their pipe lines and other
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It should be noted that Lochner-era land use and related takings
cases were not § 1983 cases. Professor Collins has shown that the Court
interpreted the rights “secured by” the Constitution in § 1983 to
exclude rights that did not “take their origin in or derive ‘directly’
from the Constitution or federal law.” 73 According to Professor
Collins, property rights, “even though protected against deprivation by
the due process clause, were defined and created by the common law;
they pre-dated the Constitution and thus took their origin outside of
it.” 74 Rather than using § 1983 and its jurisdictional provision, lower
federal court cases therefore typically were brought in diversity or as
injunction actions under § 1331. 75
II.

THE NEW DEAL AND BEYOND

A. The New Deal and the Anticonfiscation Norm
Under the “New Deal Settlement” that took shape in the late
1930s, the federal courts, with limited exceptions, stepped back from
“systematically enforcing constitutional rights against legislative
majorities.” 76 Substantive dilutions were accomplished by moving
toward rational basis scrutiny in a number of areas where the Lochner
court would have exercised more searching judicial review. And
substantive dilutions were complemented by federal jurisdictional
restrictions imposed by Congress and the Supreme Court. 77
facilities for transmitting their gas to their markets, without compensation, and to
confer same upon the owners of the approximately 180 sweet gas wells in the field
not connected to pipe lines.
Id. at 78.
73 Collins, supra note 11, at 1503.
74 Id.
75 The amount in controversy requirements could often be met for the economic
rights claimants complaining of noncompensatory rates or other regulatory confiscations,
see id. at 1509, although the same would not necessarily be true as to potential diversity
eminent domain claims.
76 David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 375 (2003); see
also David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Civil Rights and Liberties, 1930–
1941, 1987 DUKE L.J. 800 (1987); Julia D. Mahoney, Kelo’s Legacy: Eminent Domain and the
Future of Property Rights, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 109–15 (2006).
77 See Edward A. Purcell Jr., Reconsidering the Frankfurterian Paradigm: Reflections on
Histories of Lower Federal Courts, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679 (1999) (indicating that Felix
Frankfurter saw substantive and procedural decisions as forwarding the Progressive and
New Deal agenda to reduce federal court invalidation of state law); Ann Woolhandler,
Between the Acts: Federal Court Abstention in the 1940s and ’50s, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 211, 215
(2014–2015) (noting the connection between deference to state legislatures and favoring
state court review of regulation); id. at 215–16 (discussing legislative initiatives to rein in the
federal courts, as well as efforts by Frankfurter, Charles Warren, and others to direct
regulatory challenges to state courts).
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1. Pullman Abstention
The jurisdictional retreat was partly manifested in the rise of
various abstention doctrines. One of the early abstention cases,
Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 78 involved a claim of race
discrimination—an area on which the Court had yet systematically to
focus. 79 Although Pullman’s reduction of the lower federal court role
in race discrimination cases would prove temporary, Pullman abstention would survive for other types of claims, including takings.
In Pullman, the Texas Railroad Commission had issued an order
reallocating certain work from African American porters to white conductors. Although the porters challenged the order in federal court,
the Court held that the unsettled state law issue of the Commission’s
authority to make the order should be decided by the state court,
which would be able to provide a definitive resolution that the federal
court could not. 80 The state court decision might also obviate the need
to decide what the Court then perceived as a difficult Fourteenth
Amendment issue. The case left behind the doctrine of Pullman
abstention whereby a federal court may decline to hear a difficult and
undecided issue of state law that would forestall the need to decide a
sensitive issue of federal constitutional law. 81
2. Railroad Rates, Drilling Rights, and Burford Abstention
The diminution of substantive standards and lower federal court
jurisdiction would prove more lasting in economic rights areas. 82
Congress in 1934 passed the Rate Injunction Act, largely removing
challenges to state and local rates from the lower federal courts. The
Court weakened the substantive standard by abandoning Smyth v.
Ames’s current value formulation for the rate base in favor of the more
lenient multifactored test of Hope Natural Gas. 83
78 312 U.S. 496 (1941); see also Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368 (1949)
(abstaining in a case challenging Hawaii’s prohibition on foreign-language teaching).
79 Strauss, supra note 76, at 376 (stating that First Amendment law was “nascent” and
decisions striking race discrimination were “not systematic”).
80 Certification of issues to state courts was not at the time available. See RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1116 n.6, 1117 (7th ed. 2015)
(observing that all states except North Carolina now have some procedures for certification
by federal courts of appeals, and most authorize certification by district courts).
81 See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501.
82 The Court in the 1960s expanded substantive constitutional rights in a number of
areas, and retreated from abstention, particularly with respect to civil rights cases. See
Woolhandler, supra note 77, at 237–39.
83 Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944). Congress also
reined in federal court jurisdiction over injunctive cases as to state and local taxation with
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This combination of substantive and jurisdictional dilution of
economic rights was also evident in cases involving allocation of
drilling rights. In Railroad Commission v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., a
larger producer challenged a Texas Railroad Commission proration
order limiting drilling that gave nearly equal drilling rights to
productive and unproductive wells. 84 The Court reversed the lower
federal court’s grant of an injunction, and indicated that the
Fourteenth Amendment would seldom be used to police such
confiscation claims. It noted what it called the “inherent empiricism”
of common pool allocation problems and that the order should be
seen as part of a “continuous series of adjustments.” 85
In Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 86 the Court effected a jurisdictional
withdrawal. The lower court, at the instance of large neighboring tract
owners, had enjoined a Commission order allowing an owner of a 2.33acre tract to erect four wells. The Court held that the federal court
below should not have heard the action. The Court indicated that
federal court interference would confound the Commission’s “series
of adjustments” in allocating permits. 87 The case gave rise to Burford
the Tax Injunction Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 738 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1341). See
FALLON ET AL., supra note 80, at 1091–93. The Court later piled on by directing tax refund
suits once often heard by federal courts to the state courts. See id. The Act was directed to
federal courts’ injunctions against taxes based on both state and federal grounds. Before
the Act, federal courts had with some frequency enjoined state taxes based on state
constitutional provisions directing equal assessments, which could be an easier claim to
make out than a federal equal protection claim. See Woolhandler, supra note 11, at 145–
46.
84 310 U.S. 573, 577 (1940) (describing the order that first allocated 20 barrels a day
to low-capacity wells, then only 22 barrels a day to the remainder), modified at 311 U.S. 570,
576 (1941), discussed in Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Judicial Federalism and the
Administrative States, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 613, 648 (1999). When the oil company petitioned
for rehearing on the ground that pendent state law claims remained, the Court declined to
decide the pendent claim on the ground that: “What ought not to be done by the federal
courts when the Due Process Clause is invoked ought not to be attempted by these courts
under the guise of enforcing a state statute.” R.R. Comm’n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co.,
311 U.S. 614, 615 (1940); see Woolhandler, supra note 77, at 219–20.
85 Rowan & Nichols, 310 U.S. at 580, 584.
86 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
87 Id. at 332 (quoting Rowan & Nichols, 310 U.S. at 584); FALLON ET AL., supra note
80, at 1120 (stating that Justice Black “emphasized the complexity of the problems of oil
and gas regulation and the role of state courts as collaborators with a state administrative
agency in administering the state’s regulatory scheme”). The Court also adverted to the
fact that review of Commission orders was exclusively in the Courts of Travis County, and
that “the Texas courts are working partners with the Railroad Commission in the business
of creating a regulatory system for the oil industry.” Burford, 319 U.S. at 325–26; see also id.
at 318–19 (noting problems of maintaining pressure to force oil to the surface in a common
pool). “Local factors” would also feature as a reason for Burford abstention. See Ala. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n v. S. Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 346–47 (1951) (abstaining on a question of
confiscation in requiring a railroad to maintain certain unremunerative service).
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abstention, said to be available when a federal court determination
would undermine a complex state administrative scheme.
3. Land Use Cases
The substantive and jurisdictional effects of the decline of the
nonconfiscation norm, however, were more muted in the land use
context than in the rate regulation and petroleum drilling settings.
Although substantively the Court was more tolerant of land use regulation, 88 the current value formulation could not easily be abandoned
for eminent domain, in contrast to rate regulation. Nor could the
Court dilute the notion of property and its confiscation in the real
property context as readily as it did with respect to common pool
drilling rights in Rowan & Nichols.
Jurisdictional effects were similarly mixed. The federal courts
continued to hear eminent domain cases subsequent to the Lochner
era, 89 and the 1951 Amendments to the Federal Rules had special
provisions for the federal courts to handle state eminent domain
cases. 90 And in County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., the Court
held abstention inappropriate as to a diversity case raising a state law
public use question as to which state law was apparently well
established. 91 On the other hand, in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City
of Thibodaux, 92 the Court directed abstention in a diversity case as to an
unsettled issue of state law regarding the allowability of a city’s partial
condemnation of a utility company. Justice Frankfurter reasoned that
eminent domain involved a matter of “sovereign prerogative” based
on local settings. 93 And the Court in Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific
88 See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33–36 (1954) (deferring to Congress and
the agency in rejecting a Fifth Amendment challenge to a D.C. redevelopment project that
condemned land to resell or lease to private parties, and that did not look to whether the
particular property was blighted); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 5–7 (1974)
(approving single family zoning that forbad more than two unrelated persons to live in a
home, and expressing deference to land use regulation).
89 See Cnty. of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 194–96 (1959) (citing
numerous federal court eminent domain proceedings); cf. Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 203
(1945) (holding on direct review that the owner had not properly presented and preserved
the federal issue of whether interest was due from the dates of entry on his land).
90 See Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. at 194 (referring to the 1951 Rules).
91 Id. at 187, 196 (also referring to the absence of a federal constitutional issue).
92 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
93 Id. at 28 (“The issues normally turn on legislation with much local variation
interpreted in local settings.”). The turn from earlier views is manifested by Frankfurter’s
quoting, id. at 26, from Justice Holmes’s dissent in Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint
Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 257 (1905). In Madisonville, the majority had rejected
claims that review of state administrative determinations in eminent domain cases should
not be heard in the federal courts. 196 U.S. at 247.
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Railroad Co. v. Stude 94 somewhat weakened its prior willingness to treat
“appeals” from the administrative portions of eminent domain
proceedings as appropriate for federal courts. 95
In summary, the New Deal era saw a retreat from the nonconfiscation norm, and also a related retreat from lower federal court
jurisdiction in the areas of rate regulation and drilling. The
substantive and jurisdictional dilutions, however, were less dramatic in
the area of land use.
B. The Waxing and Waning of Jurisdiction Under Monell and
Williamson County
In the post-New Deal era, the federal courts continued to follow a
middling course in subsequent land use cases. The state courts, as had
always been the case, remained the primary forums for such cases. 96
When the federal courts did hear such cases, their decisions were fairly
deferential to local land use regulation in keeping with extant case
law, 97 although they sometimes granted relief. 98 Some circuits

94 346 U.S. 574 (1954).
95 Note, The Mystery of Rule 71A(k): The Elusive Right to Federal Diversity Jurisdiction over
Condemnation Actions Authorized by State Statute, 64 YALE L.J. 600, 601, 603–04, 609 (1955)
(criticizing Stude, and indicating that there was uncertainty as to when a party in an eminent
domain action could seek a federal forum if state law required an initial administrative
appraisal). Federal courts, however, despite some hurdles, have continued to hear state
eminent domain proceedings. See, e.g., Harris County v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 807 F. Supp.
2d 624, 628–29 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (holding that removal was timely because the eminent
domain proceeding became a civil action when Union Pacific filed its objections to the
special commissioners’ damages award). See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 71.1(k) (“This rule
governs an action involving eminent domain under state law.”).
96 See Ryckman, supra note 1, at 378–79 (noting that bulk of land use claims were still
in state court but that federal courts had recently become attractive).
97 See, e.g., St. Paul v. Chi., St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha R.R. Co., 413 F.2d 762, 766
(8th Cir. 1969) (using a deferential standard, and overturning the district court’s grant of
an injunction against an ordinance that restricted building height on property that the
railroad intended to sell); Blackman v. City of Big Sandy, 507 F.2d 935, 936–37 (5th Cir.
1975) (rejecting on the merits a challenge to a zoning ordinance that entailed that a gas
station would not be able to sell beer because it was in a residential area); cf. McLarty v.
Ramsey, 270 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1959) (dismissing a challenge to zoning that would have
limited commercial use of the property); id. at 234–35 (indicating that dismissal was
appropriate based on abstention and failure to seek a variance).
98 See, e.g., Foster v. City of Detroit, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968) (giving relief under
§ 1331 for interim losses from a condemnation proceeding for a housing project, begun in
1950 but abandoned in 1960); id. at 142 (indicating that when the case was brought,
Michigan case law indicated that damages would not be allowed for an abandoned
condemnation proceeding); Robertson v. City of Salem, 191 F. Supp. 604 (D. Ore. 1961)
(enjoining a city ordinance that restricted land use with a view to the state’s later acquiring
the property more cheaply).
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frequently directed abstention in land use cases, 99 using Pullman and
Burford alone or in combination. 100
Eventually there were two developments in land use cases that
pulled in different directions. One was the opening up in 1978 of
§ 1983 claims against municipalities in Monell v. Department of Social
Services. 101 The other was Williamson County’s ripeness doctrine which,
in 1985, mitigated the impact of allowing § 1983 land use claims
against municipalities. 102
As discussed above, § 1983 had generally not been considered
appropriate for property claims, based in part on a narrow version of
rights secured by the Constitution. The Court eventually abandoned
a narrow view of which rights were “secured by” the Constitution in
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization. 103 But that case
nevertheless continued to treat property claims as outside of § 1983’s
ambit. In his plurality opinion, Justice Stone reasoned that because
the jurisdictional provision for § 1983 had no amount in controversy,
§ 1983 was limited to personal rights rather than property rights. 104
The Court abandoned the distinction between property rights and
personal rights in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., a procedural due
process case. 105 Still, takings claims under § 1983 for a time remained
relatively uncommon. Then-Justice Rehnquist in his Monell dissent
observed: “It has not been generally thought, before today, that § 1983
provided an avenue of relief from unconstitutional takings. Those
99 Blaesser, supra note 2, at 92–93 (stating that in § 1983 land use actions from 1974
to 1988, the federal courts had abstained under one or more of the abstention doctrines in
close to 50% of the cases); Radford & Thompson, supra note 5, at 597–99 (discussing the
use of abstention in takings cases prior to Williamson County).
100 See Blaesser, supra note 2, at 86–87 (noting that Burford was often used in
combination with Pullman); Radford & Thompson, supra note 5, at 599–608 (discussing use
of Pullman and Burford); Ryckman, supra note 1, at 412 (discussing use of Pullman and
Burford as tending to merge in application to land use cases).
101 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
102 Thomas, supra note 2, at 512–13; see also id. at 511 (“The Court in Williamson County
adopted the state procedures requirement with little briefing (and none of the usual
percolation of issues)”); id. at 514 (indicated that the Court’s analysis was “easily subject to
attack because the Court based its holding on ripeness even though none of the parties
raised or briefed it”); id. at 515 (“[T]he Williamson County Court was flatly wrong when it
concluded the property owner could pursue a compensation remedy in a Tennessee court
for a regulatory taking under state law” as the Tennessee Supreme Court had not
interpreted the relevant state statute—and “would not do so for another three decades”—
to allow property owners to seek and get “just compensation for a regulatory taking [in
Tennessee’s courts] in an inverse condemnation lawsuit.”).
103 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (plurality opinion), discussed in Collins, supra note 11, at 1533.
104 See id. at 531–32, discussed in Collins, supra note 11, at 1534; Ryckman, supra note 1,
at 384.
105 405 U.S. 538 (1972), discussed in Ryckman, supra note 1, at 384; Collins, supra note
11, at 1537.
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federal courts which have granted compensation against state and
local governments have resorted to an implied right of action under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” 106
Monell, however, would change that. In Monell, the Court reversed
its prior holding that municipalities were not suable “persons” under
§ 1983, even if the challenged action reflected government policy.
And in Owen v. City of Independence, the Court held that municipalities
could not claim good faith immunity from damages as could individual
persons sued under § 1983. 107 While neither of these decisions
involved takings, they significantly enhanced the use of § 1983 for land
use claims. 108 The local government could be sued, because land use
decisions generally met Monell’s custom and policy requirement, and
no qualified immunities were available as to damages as they were for
individual defendants. Attorneys’ fees, moreover, would also be
available under § 1988. 109
Williamson County’s finality requirement, however, soon checked
the increase in § 1983 land use cases. 110 Williamson County held that a
takings claim was not yet ripe until the owner was denied
compensation by the state courts. 111 When combined with the somewhat inconsistent use of abstention doctrines, Williamson brought land
use cases more in line with some of the substantive economic rights
cases involving confiscation such as the railroad rate and oil drilling
cases. 112 On the other hand, coming as it did in 1985 rather than in
106 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 721 n.4 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (citing Richmond Elks Hall Ass’n v. Richmond Redev. Agency, 561 F.2d 1327
(9th Cir. 1977), aff’g 389 F.Supp. 486 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Foster v. City of Detroit, 405 F.2d
138, 140 (6th Cir. 1968)); cf. Ryckman, supra note 1, at 382–84 (indicating that before 1972,
§ 1331 was the primary authority for land use challenges in federal court, and indicating
some cases were brought under § 1983 after Lynch v. Household Finance, 405 U.S. 538
(1972)). Justice Rehnquist was responding to the majority’s relying on remarks in the
legislative history of § 1983 that referred to takings, which the majority read as supporting
municipal liability. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 721.
107 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), discussed in Ryckman, supra
note 1, at 390–91.
108 See Ryckman, supra note 1, at 389–91.
109 The amount in controversy could also be a problem in § 1331 actions prior to its
abolition in 1980. Id. at 382; see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 80, at 783 (as to the abolition
of the amount in controversy for federal question jurisdiction).
110 Williamson County can be characterized as an abstention doctrine. See Radford &
Thompson, supra note 5, at 571 (criticizing Williamson County as a form of abstention).
111 Williamson County involved a question of damages for a temporary taking by land
use restrictions, which the Court avoided deciding through its decision that the claim was
not final until the state courts had denied relief. See Sterk, supra note 1, at 239–240; Radford
& Thompson, supra note 5, at 574.
112 It also could be seen as in line with the Court’s interpreting the Tax Injunction Act
and comity to require that taxpayers pursue refund remedies in state courts rather than
federal or state court § 1983 actions. See, e.g., Nat’l Priv. Truck Council v. Okla. Tax
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the midst of the New Deal retreat from economic rights, Williamson
may indicate that the Court was looking more to limit lower federal
court exposure to takings claims rather than to dilute the
nonconfiscation norm in land use cases. Indeed, the Court would
shortly begin to bolster its substantive takings jurisprudence. 113
III.

KNICK AND THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL COURTS TAKINGS CLAIMS.

The Knick decision removes the offset that Williamson provided to
Monell’s and Owen’s encouragement of § 1983 takings cases. Not
unexpectedly, the scholarly reaction to Knick has been mixed.
Proponents of greater federal court involvement in land use cases tend
to argue that takings should be treated as favorably as other constitutional claims litigated under § 1983 and welcome greater federal court
involvement as providing for more sympathetic treatment of property
rights. 114 By contrast, opponents deplore the increased federal role as
“hint[ing] at a rejection of the post-Lochner idea that in a modern
economy, economic regulation of the sort that implicates the use of
and economic value in property must be more deferentially reviewed
by the courts.” 115
Knick thus raises the question of the extent to which the federal
courts should limit their exposure to takings claims by abstention
doctrines or some other means. 116 We consider immediately below
whether Pullman and Burford abstention are generally appropriate for
land use cases.

Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582 (1995). The Court in Williamson, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985), referred
to the Parratt line of cases, whereby the Court treats some episodic intentional torts by
government officials as potential procedural due process violations that may be redressed
by the state’s supplying a state court remedy. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
113 See, e.g., First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304 (1987) (holding that a temporary taking was compensable); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (disapproving a condition that a public easement be
dedicated to obtain a building permit where there was no “essential nexus” between the
condition and “the end advanced as the justification” for the government requirement).
114 See, e.g., Hodges, supra note 4, at 1 (welcoming the end of the Williamson ripeness
requirement); Jessica Webb, Knick v. Township of Scott: Redefining a Constitutional Injury to
Give Takings Plaintiffs Their Day in Federal Court, 94 TUL. L. REV. ONLINE 51 (2020) (same);
Vander Wal, supra note 10, at 229 (same).
115 Dana, supra note 3, at 600; cf. Pollack, supra note 10, at 238 (arguing that Knick and
other cases undermine environmental goals and are often presented on oversimplified
facts).
116 See supra notes 7–15 and accompanying text; cf. Ryckman, supra note 1, at 417
(suggesting that the increase in potential land use cases after Lynch v. Household Finance,
405 U.S. 538 (1972), and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), called
for greater use of abstention).
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A. Pullman Abstention?
Those opposing a more active federal role point out that property
rights—even if federally protected—are primarily created by state
law, 117 and that prohibition on takings “protects primarily against
change in background state law.” 118 Takings claims, they argue, are thus
more state-law-dependent than other constitutional claims and state
courts are best situated to evaluate state law. 119
Given their emphasis on state law issues, scholars who seek to
minimize the federal court role have particularly argued for Pullman
abstention. 120 The Supreme Court in Pullman said that the lower
federal court should have directed to the state court the determination
of the unsettled issue of whether the Texas Railroad Commission had
authority under state law to reallocate certain work from African
American porters to white conductors. This determination of
unsettled state law might obviate the need for the federal court to
decide whether the order violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
The federal court minimalists particularly claim that state courts
should determine unsettled “background principles” of state property
law. The emphasis on background principles stems in part from the
Court’s opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 121 which held
that regulation forbidding any economically viable use of property
would often be a categorical taking, and thus not subject to the Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City multifactor test for
determining a regulatory taking. 122 Justice Scalia’s opinion in Lucas
117 Beaton & Zinn, supra note 10, at, 631–32 (indicating that state law was important
to determining the parcel to be considered for takings, to the reasonableness of
expectations under Penn Central analysis, and to determining background principles that
could limit property rights); see also Sterk & Pollack, supra note 9, at 437–38 (stating that
state courts are in a better position than federal courts to resolve the many state law property
issues that arise in takings cases).
118 Sterk, supra note 1, at 206; see also Echeverria, supra note 9, at 11 (stating that the
nature and scope of property interests are almost always questions of state not federal law).
119 Sterk, supra note 1, at 206; see also id. at 234–35 (stating that developers are often
local and less subject to prejudice and that state courts are more familiar with local law and
conditions).
120 Beaton & Zinn, supra note 10, at 636 (arguing that Pullman was the most likely form
of abstention); see also Ryckman, supra note 1, at 397–404 (discussing propriety of Pullman
abstention due to unclear state law issues); Alicia Gonzalez & Susan L. Trevarthen, Deciding
Where to Take Your Takings Case Post-Knick, 49 STETSON L. REV. 539, 572 (2020) (discussing
Pullman as the most apt form of abstention). Presumably the minimalists would prefer the
whole case to be decided by a state court rather than just the state law issues as in Pullman,
but in any event they seem to anticipate that the state law determination would often defeat
the federal takings claim.
121 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
122 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). In Penn Central the Court emphasized its inability to
“develop any ‘set formula’ for determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require that
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also stated, however, that background principles might already limit
the owner’s property rights such that a particular restriction—even
one that forbad all economically viable use—would not be a taking.
He gave examples of nuisance law that forbids flooding a neighbor’s
property, and a preexisting navigational servitude that might prohibit
use of submerged lands. 123
The federal court minimalists take this reference to background
principles as supplying an area of unsettled state law that should
regularly evoke abstention. 124 For example, they see Nies v. Town of
Emerald Isle 125 as a case appropriately decided by a state rather than a
federal court. In Nies, the North Carolina intermediate appellate court
determined that dry sand beaches were subject to the state public trust
doctrine such as to allow certain motor vehicle access. The decision
was in line with decisions by the supreme courts of Oregon and Hawaii
that state custom or background principles gave the public easements
to the dry sand beaches, rather than just the area up to the mean high
water mark. 126 Some scholars, however, have criticized state courts’
recognition of public easements in dry sand beaches as departing from
normal common law methodology for determining custom, 127 thereby
effectively placing retroactive limits on owners’ entitlements.
economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government.” Id. The
following year, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), the Court clarified its
decision in Penn Central, stating that its practice in takings cases is to engage in “essentially
ad hoc, factual inquiries that have identified several factors—such as the economic impact
of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the
character of the governmental action—that have particular significance.” Id. at 175. These
three factors are commonly referred to as the “Penn Central test.” See THOMAS W. MERRILL
& HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 1252 n.4 (3d ed. 2017).
123 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028–29.
124 Beaton & Zinn, supra note 10, at 632 (noting background principles as an area
where state law predominates).
125 780 S.E. 2d 187, 197 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015), discussed in Dana, supra note 3, at 612;
see also Michael C. Blumm & Rachel G. Wolfard, Revisiting Background Principles in Takings
Litigation, 71 FLA. L. REV. 1165, 1184 (2019) (discussing Nies’s use of the public trust
doctrine); cf. Robert L. Glicksman, Swallowing the Rule: The Lucas Background Principles
Exception to Takings Liability, 71 FLA. L. REV. 121, 135 (2020) (indicating that Blumm and
Wolfard were describing a background principles exception that is “probably broader than
Justice Scalia anticipated or intended” in Lucas).
126 Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background
Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENV’T. L. REV. 321, 343 & n.137 (2005)
(discussing New Jersey’s use of the public trust doctrine as to dry sand beaches, citing inter
alia Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984)); id. at 350 (stating
that Oregon, Hawaii, and Texas had used custom as a basis for recreational easements in
beachfront property).
127 See, e.g., David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and
Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375, 1422–23 (1996) (criticizing the Oregon Supreme
Court’s handling of Blackstone’s factors for custom); id. at 1441, 1447–48 (arguing that
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The divergence in views as to the dry sand beaches manifests
distinct views of background principles more generally. The background principles that the Court referred to in Lucas are supposed to
exist at the time title was acquired, 128 even if some room for new
applications is allowed. 129 Thus a background principle should rarely
involve determination of a deeply “unsettled” issue of state law as
opposed to a determination that should largely turn on existing
precedent. To the extent the minimalists argue that state background
principles and other qualifications of property interests are
“undecided” applications and are more appropriate for state courts,
they perhaps see such determinations not so much as involving
evaluation of preexisting property law but rather as involving
legislative-type policymaking. 130
To say that a state court makes a legislative-type policy is not
necessarily to condemn it, particularly in light of Erie’s treating state
courts as analogous to legislators. Indeed, Pullman itself used Eriebased reasoning in stating that the federal court would only be making
a prediction as to the extent of the commission’s delegated power. But
one might think that a more restricted judicial process based on
precedent is appropriate to determine what qualifications on title

custom was generally more appropriate for parcel-by-parcel determinations based on local
usage, rather than for “rewriting the jurisdiction’s general property law, and, with one
stroke of the judicial brush, to declare public easements in the entirety of the state’s
beaches”); David L. Callies, Custom and Public Trust: Background Principles of State Property
Law?, 30 ENV’T. L. REV. 10003, 10005, 10016–18 (2000) (criticizing Oregon and Hawaii
decisions for failure to follow the traditional requirements for custom).
128 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992); Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U. S. 606, 627 (2001) (challenges to regulations that preceded acquisition are
sometimes allowed); Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 126, at 327; Christine A. Klein, The New
Nuisance: An Antidote to Wetland Loss, Sprawl, and Global Warming, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1155, 1190–
91 (2007) (applauding a broad view of background principles); James L. Huffman,
Background Principles and the Rule of Law: Fifteen Years after Lucas, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 12
(2008) (criticizing scholars’ views that the malleability of the common law allows for
expansive background principles limiting land use); William W. Fisher III, The Trouble with
Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1407–08 (1993) (criticizing the need to look at state nuisance
law at the date of acquisition).
129 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032 n.18; Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 126, at 334 (discussing
Lucas); id. at 334–35 (indicating that some courts rely on Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
which allows greater flexibility).
130 Cf. McKesson v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 48, 50–51 (2020) (per curiam) (holding that the
issue of tort liability for a demonstration organizer should be certified to the state court:
“To impose a duty under Louisiana law, courts must consider ‘various moral, social, and
economic factors,’ among them ‘the fairness of imposing liability,’ ‘the historical
development of precedent,’ and ‘the direction in which society and its institutions are
evolving.’” (quoting Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 752 So. 2d 762, 766 (La. 1999))).
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existed at the time of acquisition. 131 And a federal court should be at
least as capable as a state court in making such a determination.
Similarly, scholars who wish to minimize federal court involvement argue that background principles militate against an increased
federal role with respect to the denominator problem. 132 The
denominator problem arises when a restriction on land use affects part
of a property interest and addresses how one determines the parcel
from which to measure the diminution of value. In Murr v. Wisconsin,
the Court addressed whether two lots acquired by the same owners
merged so as to prohibit separate sale and development. The Supreme
Court prescribed a multifactored test for determining the proper
parcel. 133 While state law was one factor, 134 the Court also directed
attention to the physical characteristics of the property and the “value
of the property under the challenged regulation, with special attention
to the effect of burdened land on the value of other holdings.” 135
The minimalists would leave state courts latitude in determining
state law as to how to determine the proper parcel. But as is true for
background principles more generally, state law that goes into the
determination should largely preexist the decision in the case. Federal
courts should be capable of evaluating state law by existing caselaw and
other legal sources. 136
It should be noted, moreover, that the undecided state law issues
that the minimalists argue should be decided in state courts differ from
131 See Huffman, supra note 128, at 19, 25 (arguing that background principles and
public trust doctrines should only allow for evolutionary common law changes).
132 See Beaton & Zinn, supra note 10, at 631–32 (indicating that state law was important
in defining what parcel to look at for takings); Blumm & Wolfard, supra note 125, at 1182
(arguing that the issue of the parcel may involve a background principle); Sterk & Pollack,
supra note 9, at 438–39 (arguing that state law is important to the denominator issue). But
cf. Hodges, supra note 4, at 17–18 (criticizing some scholars’ approach to the denominator
problem). The denominator problem can be important to determining whether there is a
Lucas-type taking. See Carole Necole Brown & Dwight H. Merriam, On the Twenty-Fifth
Anniversary of Lucas: Making or Breaking the Takings Claim, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1847, 1850
(2017) (indicating that Lucas meant it was important to reduce the denominator).
133 Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017); see Maureen E. Brady, Penn Central
Squared: What the Many Factors of Murr v. Wisconsin Mean for Property Federalism, 166 U. PA.
L. REV. ONLINE 53, 54 (2017).
134 137 S. Ct. at 1947; see Nicole Stelle Garnett, From a Muddle to a Mudslide: Murr v.
Wisconsin, 2016–2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 131, 148 (2017) (criticizing Murr for paying
insufficient attention to state law in defining the relevant parcel).
135 137 S. Ct. at 1945–46.
136 The same presumably should be true as to background principles with respect to
wildlife preservation. See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1183
(Fed. Cir. 1994); Blumm & Wolfard, supra note 125, at 1170–71 (discussing the Federal
Circuit’s allowing takings claims as to water rights affected by the Endangered Species Act);
Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 126, at 353–54 (discussing wildlife protection as fitting into a
nuisance theory and other background principles generally).
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the undecided state law issue in Pullman. In Pullman, the uncertain
state law issue was whether the Texas Railroad Commission had been
delegated authority under state law to issue the order allocating work
to white conductors rather than African American porters. If the state
court determined that the commission lacked that authority, the
porters would win without the federal equal protection issue’s having
to be decided. If the state court determined that the Commission did
have the authority, the federal issue would remain open to determination in the federal courts. 137 By contrast in the takings cases, the
minimalists suggest that the state courts should be able to decide an
indeterminate state law issue in a way that will defeat the federal
takings claim. 138
Takings claims, moreover, are not unique in featuring antecedent
questions of state law entitlements that may defeat a federal
constitutional claim, and such antecedent issues have not generally
occasioned a retiring role for the federal courts. Contract Clause
claims often have a similar structure to takings claims. If no contract
existed under state law to begin with, it would often follow that no
impairment of the obligation of contract occurred. In addition,
remedies that existed at the time of the contracting could constitute
part of the contract that could not be impaired. The Supreme Court
by way of direct review and by its expansive views of lower federal court
jurisdiction 139 allowed federal courts to make their own determinations
of whether a contract existed under state law 140 and also what remedies
existed at the time of contracting and were part of the contract. 141
137 Blaesser, supra note 2, at 86 (noting that lower federal courts who used Pullman
abstention in land use cases often failed to identify the state law issue); id. at 124–25 (stating
courts should not equate unresolved applications with unsettled general principles);
Radford & Thompson, supra note 5, at 599 (noting failure to specify undecided state issues
when federal courts used Pullman for land use cases); cf. McKesson v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 48,
50–51 (2020) (holding that the federal appeals court, rather than deciding that under
Louisiana law a person who unlawfully led the protest onto a highway may be held liable
for an unknown demonstrator’s throwing an object at a policeman, should have certified
the question to the state Supreme Court); id. at 50 (claiming the state court’s determination
that there was no liability would obviate the need for the federal court to decide whether
such liability would violate the First Amendment).
138 Beaton & Zinn, supra note 10, at 636 (“As noted above, takings cases often involve
a host of state law issues that will shape or even eliminate the federal claim and thus are
natural candidates for Pullman abstention.”); cf. Ryckman, supra note 1, at 400–01 (noting
that the state and federal constitutional issues may both be whether a taking without just
compensation has occurred, but that Pullman abstention may still be appropriate).
139 White v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 307, 308 (1885) (reinstating the trespass action).
140 See, e.g., Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938).
141 See Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1885); cf. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found.,
524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998) (holding that interest on client trust accounts was private
property).
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Thus Pullman abstention generally is a poor fit in takings cases. If
one assumes that background principles of state law are to be based
largely on preexisting law rather than a freewheeling policy choice,
then federal courts are as well-situated to make those determinations
as state courts. That the determinations of state law background
principles could defeat the federal right also militates against
abstention. 142
B. Burford Abstention?
Burford on the other hand might reinforce an abstention
argument. Burford abstention is said to apply when the federal court
involvement would interfere with a complex state administrative
scheme thought to require uniform administration. 143 But apart from
this description, Burford reflected the Court’s substantive dilution of
the nonconfiscation norm in the common pool oil drilling context,
and a concomitant federal court withdrawal from deciding both
federal and state claims.
Williamson County could be seen as effecting a somewhat similar
result by directing state and federal confiscation claims to the state
courts, which effectively provided greater leeway for state and local
land use regulation. Thus it might be possible to see Knick, as do some
commentators, as signaling the abandonment of the New Deal’s
treatment of most economic regulation as subject to only deferential
judicial review. 144
The problem is that the federal courts never effected such a
drastic substantive withdrawal from federal takings claims as they did
for common pool drilling. In the context of drilling, the Court prescribed deferential scrutiny, and greater room for redistributive
policymaking by state agencies and courts. But the Court never
demoted land use claims to the same extent, given the Fifth
Amendment’s express provisions and the traditional current value
formulation for just compensation. Rather, real estate is a more
definite entitlement, and the Court treats major state-law-based
qualifications on productive use of land as largely needing to be baked
in at the time of acquisition of title. Certainly one can discern a desire
142 Certification as well as Pullman would be appropriate if the state law issue has a
greater resemblance to that in Pullman. Cf. Dana, supra note 3, at 617–18 (recommending
certification); Beaton & Zinn, supra note 10, at 637–38 (recommending certification in
some cases). The Supreme Court has expressed a preference for certification over Pullman
abstention. Arizonans for Off. Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75–80 (1997).
143 See, e.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 80, at 1120.
144 See Dana, supra note 3, at 600; cf. Pollack, supra note 10, at 238 (arguing that Knick
and other cases undermine environmental goals, and are often presented on oversimplified
facts).
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to limit lower federal court exposure to takings cases in Williamson
County, 145 but one cannot safely say that the Court meant to change
substantive doctrine as dramatically as it had in the oil drilling context.
C. A More Customized Land Use Abstention Doctrine?
Even assuming that neither Pullman nor Burford provides an
appropriate basis for abstention, the federal courts may be inclined to
find some ways to thin out federal takings claims. The state courts have
always entertained most land use cases, and there is certainly some
sense to the minimalists’ point that federal courts will not want to
become boards of zoning appeals. 146 Perhaps the Supreme Court
could leave the lower federal courts to apply existing abstention
doctrines as they have in the past. 147 Ad hoc abstention, however,
invites inconsistency 148 and an undesirable expenditure of time on
such jurisdictional issues. Another possibility is to recognize a form of
abstention particular to takings claims that uses more or less
categorical exclusions.
Claims for injunctive relief alone may often be appropriate federal
court actions. As Professor McConnell pointed out in discussing the
federal courts’ hearing a takings challenge to an agricultural
marketing order: “There are many statutory schemes under which the
government has not agreed to pay compensation—indeed, where the
payment of compensation would be inconsistent with the purposes of
the statutory program.” 149 And cases such as Knick where the
landowner was seeking to enjoin threatened enforcement of a
generally applicable law seem appropriate for a federal forum. 150

145 The preclusion effects of Williamson may have been obscure at that point. Certainly,
one can discern a desire for limitations or filters before takings cases were brought in lower
federal courts.
146 See Ryckman, supra note 1, at 380 (“[T]he essentially local character of these
disputes and their potential for resolution on nonconstitutional grounds should make
federal courts wary of assuming the role of a zoning appeals court through the exercise of
primary and pendent jurisdiction.”).
147 This is not to suggest that the lower courts would use Burford’s near across-the-board
abstention; the Court’s overturning Williamson indicates that is not what the Court has in
mind.
148 See Blaesser, supra note 2, at 117 (finding significant variations among the circuits
in their use of abstention in land use cases); id. at 118–19 (arguing that greater familiarity
with local conditions is not a good reason to abstain under Burford or Pullman); McConnell,
supra note 2, at 10751 (arguing that local knowledge generally does not trump the right to
go to federal court).
149 McConnell, supra note 2, at 10750.
150 Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2168. Of course, refusal to grant a permit ultimately involves a
threat of enforcement.
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So-called facial takings claims, generally for injunctions, were
allowed into lower federal courts even before Knick. These were
sometimes defined as claims not tied to the individual economic effects
on the landowner. 151 But the Court in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 152
held that claims that a statute failed to advance a substantial
government interest are properly characterized as substantive due
process claims, not takings claims. The due process categorization for
claims that do not fall into narrower takings categories generally means
that such claims have little chance of success on federal grounds. 153
While the likely lack of merit may suggest that these cases should be
treated like other economic rights cases that the federal courts have
retreated from, these cases may be relatively easily disposed of on the
merits if filed in federal courts. If one is looking for a sorting device,
then perhaps these injunction-only claims should remain in federal
courts.
Allegations of loss of all economically viable use under the
standards of Lucas present a category that also may be appropriate for
lower federal courts. Lucas or “wipeout” cases are to a degree separable from less drastic regulatory takings cases that are more likely to be
determined under the Penn Central multifactor approach and, in
addition, Lucas claims are more likely to be viable. 154 In such cases, the
government may raise a background principles defense, but as noted
above, the federal courts may be able to add to the fairness of these
determinations by evaluating prior state court precedent. In addition,
to the extent such cases may present issues of the proper parcel or
denominator, federal courts should be able to make such
determinations under the moderate Murr standard. 155
151 See San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 345–46 & n.25
(2005).
152 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (involving an unsuccessful challenge to a statute limiting rents
that oil companies could charge gas station lessees).
153 The courts can decline supplemental jurisdiction. For injunction actions against
state-level officials, Pennhurst already disallows state claims. See generally Daniel R.
Mandelker, Litigating Land Use Cases in Federal Court: A Substantive Due Process Primer, 55
REAL PROP., TR. & EST. L.J. 69 (2020) (arguing that substantive due process should be used
for addressing very arbitrary land use decisions, and that a shock the conscience standard
is too strict).
154 Merriam, supra note 9, at 650 (noting there are few good Penn Central claims);
Huffman, supra note 128, at 2–3 (indicating Penn Central claims had rarely been successful);
Brady, supra note 19, at 1471 (“[R]ecent empirical studies show that Penn Central claims
have an abysmal success rate approximating zero.” (footnote omitted)); cf. Callies &
Ashford, supra note 10, at 146–47 (arguing that federal courts could have contributed to a
fairer result in a Lucas-type case decided by Hawaii courts).
155 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945–46 (2017), discussed in text accompanying notes 132–36. The
temporal severance issue may present largely a federal question. The problems with this
question may have been exacerbated by Knick’s statements as to when compensation is due.
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As noted above, cases involving non-wipeout restrictions decided
under Penn Central balancing are perhaps more appropriate for state
courts. In addition, a large category in land use practice involves
questions of impact fees and dedications associated with development,
and their routine nature suggests that federal court involvement
should be limited. 156 In Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Court prescribed a
test of “rough proportionality” 157 of the exaction to the impact of the
proposed development. 158 While there may be some benefit in federal
court applications of the intermediate standard, the routine nature of
these claims again may suggest a larger state court role.
Any attempt to draw categorical lines will be problematic. Federal
courts may be able to contribute to the fairness of application of the
Penn Central factors, and the intermediate standards for impact fees
and exactions. Thus it is reasonable to argue that no such presumptive
exclusions should occur. But if federal courts, as seems likely, will want
to limit takings claims, some categorical inclusions and exclusions
seem not only desirable but unavoidable. Lucas and Murr cases seem
to be areas where the federal courts could most usefully contribute to
a fair assessment of entitlements as they existed at the time title was
acquired.
Some might question fashioning a new abstention doctrine
specifically for takings claims. Abstention has been the subject of
debate between those arguing that federal courts are obliged to
exercise the jurisdiction provided in congressional statutes, 159 and
those arguing that the federal courts can exercise “principled

See Dana, supra note 3, at 597–98, 619–20; Pakdel v. City of San Francisco, 141 S. Ct. 2226,
2230, 2231 (2021) (per curiam) (indicating that finality would be met when there was no
question as to how the regulation would apply to the particular land or when government
had reached a conclusive position); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 321 (2002) (holding that temporary development moratoria should be
analyzed under Penn Central rather than under a per se rule); see also Sterk & Pollack, supra
note 9, at 441 (noting that Knick meant that federal courts would often have to determine
when a taking became final). See generally Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness
in the Federal Courts, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1995) (discussing various timing issues involved in
takings litigation).
156 Beaton & Zinn, supra note 10, at 626 (“In our experience in representing public
agencies in takings litigation, exactions challenges represent a large share of regulatory
takings claims in the land use context.”).
157 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
158 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). Some state courts at the
time used a comparable test, while others used more and less stringent tests. Dolan, 512
U.S. at 391.
159 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial
Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 72, 74 (1984).
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discretion” to decline to exercise jurisdiction. 160 There is also debate
as to whether abstention should be reserved for equitable actions. 161
But due to concerns for federalism as well as judicial administration,
the federal courts since the mid-twentieth century have directed a
good many land use cases involving both legal and equitable relief to
state courts under abstention and related doctrines. In addition, the
federal courts’ declining to hear some land use cases is supported by
their refusal to hear—based on federalism and comity concerns—most
claims for monetary relief arising from state taxation. 162
D. Limiting Use of § 1983
An additional or alternative possibility—although one the Court
may be unlikely to adopt—is simply to exclude takings claims from the
ambit of § 1983. As discussed above, takings claims were late to the
table as § 1983 actions. 163 They were not clearly within the intended
scope of the 1871 Civil Rights Act. And the Court at first did not treat
most economic rights claims as “rights secured by the Constitution,”
because property rights preexisted the Constitution. Subsequently
160 See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 578, 588
(1985); id. at 579 (suggesting that criteria for the federal courts’ declining jurisdiction may
be grouped as “equitable discretion, federalism and comity, separation of powers, and
judicial administration”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Why Abstention is Not Illegitimate: An Essay
on the Distinction Between “Legitimate” and “Illegitimate” Statutory Interpretation and Judicial
Lawmaking, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 847, 880 (2013) (concluding that “Professor Redish was
wrong to conclude that the best reading of the Constitution and relevant statutes precludes
federal judicial abstention under all circumstances”). See generally FALLON ET AL., supra note
80, at 1105–06 & n.4 (discussing the debate and citing authority).
161 See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 731 (1996) (“Under our
precedents, federal courts have the power to dismiss or remand cases based on abstention
principles only where the relief being sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary.”);
Fallon, supra note 160, at 869–70 (noting that Quackenbush nevertheless allowed staying
federal court non-equity proceedings, which operates similarly to abstention); Quakenbush,
517 U.S. at 719–21 (distinguishing stays from abstention and citing the stay allowed in
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959)); FALLON ET AL., supra
note 80, at 1107–08 (discussing whether abstention could be appropriate in both law and
equity, and apparently suggesting that it was); Shapiro, supra note 160, at 551 (stating that
the abstention cases “have not been confined to actions in equity, and it is hard to see why
they should be”).
162 See, e.g., Fair Assessment in Real Est. Ass’n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981); cf.
Shapiro, supra note 160, at 567–68, 587 (indicating that the Court’s exclusion from § 1331
of a range of cases involving land disputes where title traced back to the United States was
defensible on grounds of judicial administration).
163 See supra notes 73–75, 106–13, and accompanying text. But cf. Blaesser, supra note
2, at 135 (arguing that excluding takings claims from federal courts was never intended by
the Congress when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871); Radford & Thompson, supra
note 5, at 612–13 (arguing that federal courts’ failure to entertain takings cases was contrary
to the congressional command to hear § 1983 cases).
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Justice Stone indicated that § 1983 encompassed liberty but not
property claims. Even after the Court abandoned the liberty/property
distinction, § 1983 was not much used for land use claims until after
Monell and Owen opened up prospects for municipal liability that it
would be difficult to attribute to the framers of the 1871 Civil Rights
Act. But even that potential increase in claims was checked until
recently by Williamson.
Takings claims thus could be returned to their historical home as
diversity actions or as constitutionally-based actions brought under
§ 1331. While the Court lately has been disinclined to imply a damages
remedy directly under the Constitution, 164 it has stated that the
obligation to provide compensation for a taking is self-executing and
does not depend on a particular legislative grant. 165 Thus a
constitutionally-based takings claim brought under § 1331 might be
somewhat more acceptable to the current Court than other implied
constitutional claims involving monetary relief.
Standing in the way of removing takings claims from § 1983 is the
Court’s current plain meaning approach to determine which
constitutional claims are covered by § 1983. 166 Monell, however, only
questionably relied on § 1983’s plain meaning, as opposed to its
debatable legislative history, in holding cities liable as persons under
§ 1983. 167 In some areas, moreover, the Court has retreated from the
plain meaning approach. For example, the Court in Maine v.
Thiboutot 168 used a plain meaning approach for employing § 1983 to
address statutory violations, which it later abandoned. 169 In addition,
claims of statutory preemption generally proceed as statute-based
164 See, e.g., Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 742 (2020) (refusing to imply an action
for a cross-border killing due to alleged use of excessive force).
165 Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933); First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (“We have recognized that a landowner
is entitled to bring an action in inverse condemnation as a result of ‘the self-executing
character of the constitutional provision with respect to compensation. . . .’” (quoting
United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980))).
166 Professor Collins has argued against such a plain meaning approach, based on
legislative intent surrounding § 1983, the judicial practice of using the general federal
question jurisdictional provision for bringing economic rights claims, and the diminished
need for § 1983’s remedial scheme as to economic rights. See Collins, supra note 11, at
1542.
167 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servis., 436 U.S. 658, 688–89 (1978) (“Municipal
corporations in 1871 were included within the phrase ‘bodies politic and corporate’ and,
accordingly, the ‘plain meaning’ of § 1 is that local government bodies were to be included
within the ambit of the persons who could be sued under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act.”)
(quoting Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431, 431 (1871)). But cf. supra notes
54–59, sources cited therein, and accompanying text.
168 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
169 See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
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injunctive actions under § 1331 rather than § 1983 claims. Based on
concerns about state tax administration, 170 the Court also has read out
of § 1983 actions seeking monetary relief for taxes. 171 Excluding tax
refund claims from § 1983 even when based on constitutional
infirmities means that attorneys’ fees are unavailable under § 1988—
an incentive to suit that the Court may see as unnecessary given the
parties who raise such claims.
Allowing land use claims to be framed as § 1983 takings claims
brings along attorneys’ fees in both state and federal courts. And
because the federal courts may be more likely to decide the cases based
on § 1983 rather than state law grounds, the availability of attorneys’
fees increases incentives to file in federal courts. 172 The added incentive of attorneys’ fees may be unnecessary to assure vindication of these
claims. 173
CONCLUSION
For most of the nation’s history, federal courts have taken a
moderately active role in adjudicating property rights claims against
state and local governments. This role was substantially reduced by the
Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in Williamson County, which limited
access to federal courts for takings litigants by treating their claims as
unripe.
In Knick v. Township of Scott, the Court put an end to Williamson
County’s ripeness doctrine, but the question of how federal courts will
handle the potential influx of takings cases remains unanswered. In
this Article, we have detailed how federal courts can take steps toward
crafting an abstention doctrine particular to takings cases that
170 Nat’l Private Truck Council v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 589 (1985) (indicating
there was no § 1983 injunction or declaratory action, even if pursued in state court); id. at
584, 587 (relying on federalism and comity); Fair Assessment in Real Est. Ass’n, Inc. v.
McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981) (stating no § 1983 damages action existed for monetary relief
in a tax case).
171 The Tax Injunction Act excluded most injunctions from federal courts so long as a
plain, speedy, and efficient remedy existed at state law. The taxpayer generally must use
state law actions rather than federal causes of action. 28 U.S.C. § 1341.
172 Cf. Sterk, supra note 1, at 266, 268–69 (noting that some state courts rely on state
law to avoid financial consequences to municipalities). Attorneys’ fees are available for
some state law claims. See Brady, supra note 19, at 1472.
173 Merriam, supra note 9, at 653–54 (“Actions applying Knick include the greater use
and the threat of successful plaintiffs recovering their attorney’s fees under Section 1988.”);
cf. City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 123–24 (2005) (holding that § 1983
did not provide a vehicle for enforcement of the Telecommunications Act of 1996’s, 47
U.S.C. § 332(c)(7), provisions as to location of wireless communication facilities, reasoning
inter alia, that § 1988’s attorneys’ fee provisions would have a “particularly severe impact”
on local governments).
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comports with the federal courts’ traditional role and that will help to
ensure prudent deployment of judicial resources. We have also drawn
on history and federalism to explain the benefits of allowing takings
claims to be brought as diversity actions or constitutionally grounded
actions under § 1331, rather than relying on § 1983.

